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DEATH OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS:
PRIOR RESTRAINT, DUE PROCESS
AND THE ELUSIVE FIRST AMENDMENT
VALUE OF CONTENT NEUTRALITY
EDWARD L. CARTER*
BRAD CLARK**
In recent years, federal courts eroded the procedural
safeguards required for prior restraint licensing
schemes established in Freedman v. Maryland. The
Supreme Court of the United States stated that the
dangers of prior restraint were accounted for by content
neutrality. But a close examination of federal courts of
appeals opinions since 2002 reveals that erosion of
procedural safeguards may threaten speech interests.
First, procedural safeguards have not been required, in
some cases, even for content-based prior restraints.
Second, courts of appeals have held that, in the context
of content-neutral prior restraints, the First Amendment
no longer requires a time limit on the initial
administrative censor’s decision about whether to allow
speech. This limit was key to ensuring due process, and
its absence allows government to stifle speech it
disfavors even while maintaining the appearance of
content neutrality.

Since 1931, when the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down a government effort to prevent publication of a “scandalous”
newspaper in Near v. Minnesota,1 few sentiments have been evoked
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as often as the one that came to embody the doctrine of prior restraint: “Any system of prior restraint … comes to this Court bearing
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”2 While this
principle has received much lip service, it has not prevented federal
and state governments from engaging in prior restraint of substantial amounts of speech. A close examination of recent federal court
opinions reveals that, at least with respect to so-called contentneutral prior restraints in the context of licensing, the presumption
has been somewhat reversed: Many prior restraints are now presumed constitutional and may be immediately effected unless and
until the speech proponent goes to court and carries the burden to
show the speech should be protected.
This study analyzes recent prior restraint challenges in the Supreme Court and United States Circuit Courts of Appeal in order to
draw conclusions about the theoretical and practical validity of content neutrality as a primary value of the prior restraint doctrine and,
by extension, free speech jurisprudence generally. Since 2002, federal courts have chipped away at the procedural safeguards that
were required for licensing schemes to pass constitutional muster after Freedman v. Maryland.3 The procedural safeguards advanced in
that case largely have been eviscerated in light of federal courts’ conclusions that the dangers of prior restraint are not present when licensing schemes are content neutral.
Analysis of these opinions, however, shows that speech interests
are being threatened and sometimes impaired in at least two ways by
this erosion of procedural safeguards in favor of content neutrality.
First, courts sometimes have not required procedural safeguards
even when prior restraints were content-based. Second, federal
courts of appeals uniformly have interpreted two Supreme Court
opinions since 2002 to mean that the First Amendment no longer requires a time limit on the initial administrative decision about
whether to allow speech in a content-neutral prior restraint licensing
scheme. Elimination of the time-limit requirement, which constituted the essence of Freedman’s concern for ensuring due process in
case of threatened speech deprivation, may allow government to suppress speech it disfavors even while maintaining the appearance of
content neutrality.
The death of procedural safeguards would in large part mark the
end of the era of “First Amendment due process,” as Professor Henry
2Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
3380 U.S. 51 (1965).

PRIOR RESTRAINT & PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

227

Monaghan called the Court’s jurisprudence after Freedman.4 In a
seminal article identifying the rise of procedural safeguards as a
means of protecting speech due process, Professor Monaghan quoted
Justice Felix Frankfurter: “‘The history of American freedom is, in
no small measure, the history of procedure.’”5 Professor Monaghan
and the Supreme Court on which he commented advanced the idea
that procedural safeguards such as those expounded in Freedman
“‘assume[d] an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.’”6 Professor Monaghan noted that
the notion of speech due process, which arose not from the Fifth or
Fourteenth amendments but rather directly from the First Amendment itself, first took shape in obscenity cases; nevertheless, he argued, the Court’s rationale that procedures must be in place in order
to “show ‘the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression’”7 applied just as well to attempted prior restraints of other speech, including political speech. Using the same rationale, the contemporary
erosion of procedural safeguards for content-neutral prior restraints
of sexually oriented speech may also erode due process for other
types of speech.
In this article, we first review the longstanding constitutional
aversion to prior restraints and content-based regulation of speech.
We then track the rise and fall of procedural safeguards as
protections against improper prior restraints of speech. We note
that, in two opinions since 2002, the Supreme Court has not required
procedural safeguards for content-neutral prior restraint licensing
regimes. We discuss the merits of the Court’s replacement of procedural safeguards with the ideal of content neutrality. We also analyze seventeen courts of appeals opinions since 2002 applying the
Court’s new approach and discuss the effect of those opinions on
speech interests. We conclude that death of procedural safeguards in
the content-neutral regulation context poses the threat of undermining protections against improper government regulation of speech.
The reality of this threat is demonstrated by the appeals courts’
opinions, some of which did not require procedural safeguards even
for content-based regulation or concluded that administrative censors no longer face a reasonable time deadline in making a decision

4See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1970).
5Id. at 518 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J., separate opinion)).
6Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958)).
7Id. at 519 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
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about whether to allow speech in a content-neutral permit scheme.
Ultimately, the direction of recent jurisprudence could undermine
substantive speech protections and longstanding constitutional
guarantees of due process in the prior restraint context.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press.”8 The Supreme Court has “interpreted the First Amendment as providing greater protection from
prior restraints than from subsequent punishments.”9 There is a
deep and longstanding aversion in First Amendment jurisprudence
to prior restraints, in part because of the sixteenth and seventeenth
century English roots of prior restraint in licensing schemes.10 In alluding to this aversion, the Supreme Court concluded that “a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.”11
With respect to First Amendment jurisprudence generally, scholars have identified two regulatory tracks.12 On the first track, government regulation targets the message of speech directly because
of concerns with its communicative impact.13 Track one speech regulations14 include prohibitions against incitement to imminent unlawful conduct,15 fighting words and true threats,16 obscenity17 and
some libels.18 Track two regulations, meanwhile, do not primarily
target the communicative impact of speech, although regulations in

8U.S.

CONST. amend. I.
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 554 (1993). See also Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (“The presumption against
prior restraints is heavier—and the degree of protection broader—than that against
limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties.”).
10Id.
11Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559.
12See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–2, at 791
(1988); Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech
and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993).
13See Alexander, supra note 12, at 921.
14For a comprehensive list, see id. at 922 n.4.
15See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
16See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
17See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
18See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9Alexander
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this area may impose incidental burdens on speech.19 In this second track, for example, government may place restrictions on the
time, place or manner of speech in a public forum,20 or government
may regulate conduct that has an expressive component.21 One
scholar concluded that Supreme Court cases in track one, where
the government engages in content-based regulation, are generally
speech-protective; on the other hand, the Court’s cases in track
two, where the regulation is content neutral, are not generally
speech-protective.22
Scholars have concluded that contemporary prior restraint jurisprudence fails to adequately protect the right of the press to publish
what it wishes.23 Other scholars have condemned prior restraints
that are imposed without the benefit of judicial review.24 While there
have been proposals to improve the prior restraint doctrine,25 the
scholarship has not, for the most part, focused attention on the demise of the Freedman procedural safeguards26 and recent efforts by
federal courts, in light of that demise, to apply content neutrality in
place of the safeguards.

19See

TRIBE, supra note 12, at 792; Alexander, supra note 12, at 923.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1981).
21See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22See Alexander, supra note 12, at 925.
23See, e.g., Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 470–72 (1987).
24See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in
First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 99–100 (1984).
25See id. at 57 (proposing that all prior restraints imposed before a judicial hearing are unconstitutional). See also, Richard Favata, Note, Filling the Void in First
Amendment Jurisprudence: Is There a Solution for Replacing the Impotent System
of Prior Restraints?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (2003) (proposing that clearly invalid
prior restraints be ignored under a collateral bar rule); Smith, supra note 23, at 447–
50 (favoring the absolutist view that the government may not impose any prior restraints on the news media).
26Some recent student-written legal scholarship has begun to discuss the impact
on the Freedman safeguards of two Supreme Court opinions since 2002—Thomas v.
Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002) and City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J.
Gifts D–4, 541 U.S. 774 (2004). For example, one note called for preservation of the
Freedman safeguards and even advocated that they be applied regardless of whether
the regulation in question is content-based or content-neutral. See Kathryn F. Whittington, Note, The Prior Restraint Doctrine and the Freedman Protections: Navigating a Gigantic Labyrinth, 52 FLA. L. REV. 809 (2000). Similarly, a comment
addressed Thomas, which held that the safeguards were not required for contentneutral prior restraint schemes. The author raised the issue of the difficulty for
courts to distinguish between content-based prior restraint schemes and contentneutral regimes. See Robert H. Whorf, The Dangerous Intersection at Prior Restraint and “Time, Place, Manner”: A Comment on Thomas v. Chicago Park District,
3 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2002).
20See
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RISE AND FALL OF SAFEGUARDS
IN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
In 1965, the Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland27 articulated a series of procedural safeguards that must be in place in order
for a system of prior restraint to pass muster under the First Amendment. The Court’s articulation of the safeguards came in response to
a Maryland statute that required all motion pictures to be approved
by the State Board of Censors before they could be exhibited.28 Under the law, the board was to approve films that were “moral and
proper” and was to “disapprove such as are obscene, or such as tend,
in the judgment of the Board, to debase or corrupt morals or incite to
crimes.”29
The Supreme Court held that the Maryland censorship law unconstitutionally abridged the freedom of speech because it failed to provide three procedural safeguards. First, the Court held that the
regulatory scheme must place the burden of proving that the film
was not protected expression on the state censor rather than on the
film proponent.30 Second, the censorship program could not have the
effect of rendering the censor’s determination final;31 rather, any
temporary restraint pending a judicial determination must preserve
the status quo. Third, the regulatory scheme “must also assure a
prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an
interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.”32
The Supreme Court emphasized that the procedural safeguards
were necessary even though the speech proponent would have the
substantive protections of First Amendment law. First, “Because the
censor’s business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may
well be less responsive than a court—part of an independent branch
of government—to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.”33 The censor’s decision might in practice be final if the review process involves delay or is otherwise onerous. Second, the
27380

U.S. 51 (1965).
Maryland law stated in part: “It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said
film or view has been submitted by the exchange, owner or lessee of the film or view
and duly approved and licensed by the Maryland State Board of Censors, hereinafter
in this article called the Board.” MD. CODE ANN. art. 66A, §2 (1957), quoted in Freedman, 380 U.S. at 53 (1965).
29MD. CODE ANN. art. 66A, §6(a) (1957), quoted in Freedman, 380 U.S. at 53.
30Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
31Id. at 58–59.
32Id. at 59.
33Id. at 57–58.
28The
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Court concluded, not every speech proponent who faces censorship
will have the resources to initiate litigation.34 In that case, some
speech will be lost and the overall quantity of speech will be less than
if the procedural safeguards had been in place.
The procedural safeguards expounded in Freedman were not confined to the context of film censorship. The Court subsequently applied them to the regulatory schemes that resulted in seizure of
photographs by U.S. customs agents,35 seizure of mail by U.S. postal
officials,36 and rejection of an application to stage a musical in a municipal theater.37 The procedural safeguards also were applied to a
nuisance statute,38 a professional licensing scheme for charity fund
raising,39 and a licensing system for adult businesses.40 Some equivocal language in a 1990 Supreme Court opinion led to a split in the federal circuit courts of appeal about whether a judicial resolution or
mere access to judicial proceedings was required.41 Ultimately, the
Court quashed the notion that it had ever deviated from the judicial
resolution requirement, thus apparently resolving the split in favor
of vigorous protection of speech.42
In two recent decisions, however, the Court appears to have significantly limited the application of Freedman’s procedural safeguards.
First, in Thomas v. Chicago Park District43 in 2002, the Court held
for the first time that the Freedman procedural safeguards did not
apply to a content-neutral permit scheme regulating the time, place
34Id.

at 59.
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
36Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
37Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
38Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
39Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
40FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
41Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, id. but a portion of her opinion was joined only by two other justices,
and in that portion Justice O’Connor wrote that “there must be the possibility of
prompt judicial review in the event that [a] license is erroneously denied.” 493 U.S.
at 228 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). In the wake of this opinion, three federal circuit
courts of appeal concluded that Justice O’Connor’s language had altered one of the
Freedman safeguards from prompt judicial resolution to mere prompt judicial review. See Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc); TK’s
Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Texas, 24 F.3d 705, 707–08 (5th Cir. 1994); Boss Capital, Inc. v. Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 1999). Meanwhile, three
circuit courts determined that prompt judicial resolution was still required. See
11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George’s Co., Maryland, 58 F.3d 988, 992 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc); Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101–
02 (9th Cir. 1998); Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 890 (6th Cir.
2000).
42See City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D–4, 541 U.S. 774, 781 (2004).
43534 U.S. 316 (2002).
35United
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or manner of speech in a public forum. The Court reasoned that requiring protest groups—like other, non-expressive groups such as
soccer players—to obtain a ministerial park permit did not pose dangers to speech because the regulation did not target speech content:
The Park District’s ordinance does not authorize a licensor to pass
judgment on the content of speech: None of the grounds for denying a
permit has anything to do with what a speaker might say. Indeed, the
ordinance (unlike the classic censorship scheme) is not even directed to
communicative activity as such, but rather to all activity conducted in
a public park.44

The Court was satisfied that the permit system, which was designed to prevent dangerous uses of municipal parks and to guarantee financial accountability in the event of damage to city facilities,
was “not the kind of prepublication license deemed a denial of liberty
since the time of John Milton but a ministerial, police routine for adjusting the rights of citizens so that the opportunity for effective freedom of speech may be preserved.”45
Two years later, in City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J. Gifts D-4,46 the
Court took its predilection for content neutrality a step further in
holding that the procedural safeguards of Freedman did not apply to a
licensing regulatory scheme for adult businesses as long as that
scheme was content neutral toward speech. The Court addressed
Freedman’s prompt judicial resolution requirement but did not discuss the other two procedural safeguards: placement of the burden of
proof on the censor and maintenance of the status quo.47 Although the
Court ostensibly concluded that a prompt judicial resolution and not
mere judicial access was necessary, it nevertheless concluded that the
regular judicial process already provided for relatively prompt resolution of First Amendment cases, like other cases.48 The Court seemed
unconcerned with any possible temporary restriction on speech primarily because the regulatory scheme was content neutral.49
44Id.

at 322.
at 323.
46541 U.S. 774 (2004).
47Id. at 782.
48Id. at 784 (“Colorado’s rules provide for a flexible system of review in which
judges can reach a decision promptly in the ordinary case, while using their judicial
power to prevent significant harm to First Amendment interests where circumstances require.”).
49Id. at 783 (“And the simple objective nature of the licensing criteria means that
in the ordinary case, judicial review, too, should prove simple, hence expeditious. . . .
Where (as here and as in FW/PBS) the regulation simply conditions the operation of
45Id.
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PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CONTENT NEUTRALITY
Scholars have recognized that content neutrality threatens to become the dominating principle of free speech jurisprudence.50 The
requirement of content neutrality stems from the idea that one of the
major goals, if not the primary objective, of the First Amendment’s
speech and press clauses is to prevent the government from regulating speech based on its particular message. Advocates of this position
contend that “equality is at the core of the First Amendment” and
that “[t]o allow the government to target particular views or subjects
permits the government to greatly distort the marketplace of
ideas.”51 This view, however, was not always the predominant interpretation of the meaning of the First Amendment. Early Supreme
Court cases did not express concern with whether government regulation distinguished speech based on content, and it was not until the
late 1930s that the Court even began to suggest that content-based
regulation was likely to be more constitutionally suspect than content-neutral regulation.52
Under the Supreme Court’s body of case law applying the doctrine of content neutrality, content-based government regulation of
speech is presumed invalid and is subjected to strict scrutiny.53
Strict scrutiny requires that the government demonstrate it has a

an adult business on compliance with neutral and nondiscretionary criteria … and
does not seek to censor content, an adult business is not entitled to an unusually
speedy judicial decision of the Freedman type.”). This sentiment was expressed by
the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1993 when it questioned the need for
Freedman’s procedural safeguards and stated: “A person always has a judicial forum
when his speech is allegedly infringed.” Graff, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993).
50See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 SO. CAL. L. REV. 49,
53 (2000) (“Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the application of the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”); Chris Demaske,
Modern Power and the First Amendment: Reassessing Hate Speech, 9 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 273, 274 (2004) (“Current free speech analysis is based in large part on content neutrality.”).
51Chemerinsky, supra note 50, at 55–56.
52See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113, 121 (1981). Redish recounts that, through the early years of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court “reserved much of its rhetoric about the values of free expression for cases invalidating content-neutral restrictions.” Id. He
contends that it was not until Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), that the Court
turned away from concern for content-neutral regulations and began to emphasize
the particular dangers of content-based regulations. Id. at 123.
53See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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compelling interest in regulating speech and that its regulation be
narrowly drawn to accomplish that purpose without affecting expression too broadly.54 By contrast, the Supreme Court subjects
content-neutral speech regulation only to an intermediate level of
scrutiny “because in most cases [such regulation poses] a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public
dialogue.”55 Intermediate scrutiny requires only that government
regulation further a substantial government interest. The regulation must be narrowly drawn and leave open ample opportunity for
the message to be communicated through alternative channels.56
The relaxed nature of judicial review under intermediate scrutiny
is embodied in United States v. O’Brien,57 in which the Court upheld a regulation that prohibited draft-card burning. In O’Brien,
the Court was largely unconcerned with the regulation’s “incidental”—yet substantial—effect on speech.58
Even as the distinction between content-based and contentneutral regulation has become seemingly all-important, the exact
definition of those concepts and even the basis for making such a distinction has remained somewhat murky.59 With respect to the basis
for making the distinction, there are at least two possibilities: first,
the intent or purpose of the government in propagating and enforcing the regulation; and, second, the impact of the regulation on expression. With respect to legislative intent, the Supreme Court has
stated both that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration”60 in determining whether regulation is content based
and that “[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a viola-

54See

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 642.
56See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
57391 U.S. 367 (1968).
58Under O’Brien, the Court required that “the governmental interest [be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [that] the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 391 U.S. at 377.
59Scholarly discussion of this issue has noted that the distinction is difficult to
draw. One scholar, for example, demonstrated how ostensibly content-neutral prior
restraints can actually be content based when he established that some prior restraint schemes require private would-be speakers to show proof of insurance in case
of damage to public property; insurance costs, however, are clearly applied in a content-based way, as it is common actuarial practice to charge more for insurance
sought by unknown or distrusted groups because they pose a higher risk. See Eric
Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of
Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 308–37 (1985).
60Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
55Turner
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tion of the First Amendment.”61 Given confusion about whether legislative purpose is the key consideration behind content neutrality—
not to mention the notorious difficulty of ascertaining the collective
intent of a legislative body—it is not surprising that the definition of
content-based regulation remains unclear.62
The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that “[d]eciding whether
a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”63 The Court has blithely stated that regulation
is content based when the government adopts the regulation because
of disagreement with the message conveyed64 or because of hostility
or favoritism toward a particular message.65 On the other hand, the
Court has said, regulation is content neutral when it “confer[s] benefits or impose[s] burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or
views expressed.”66 But it is not clear that the Supreme Court and
other federal and state courts effectively recognize the difference between content-neutral and content-based regulation and make correct classification decisions.67
Content neutrality has been criticized as being too narrow; among
other proposals, scholars have suggested that an appropriate analytical framework would take into account not just whether the government targets a message for its content but also whether the speech is
commercial or political (that is, the nature or character of speech)
and whether the restriction is partial or total (that is, the scope of
regulation), among other circumstantial factors.68 Moreover, the
Court has never convincingly explained why content-neutral regulation is less harmful to First Amendment interests than contentbased regulation. Theoretically, content-neutral regulation could
abridge more speech than content-based regulation because, carried

61Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
62For a close analysis of the definitional difficulties associated with the Supreme
Court’s distinction between content-based regulation and content-neutral regulation, see Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69 (1997).
63Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
64Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
65R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
66Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 643.
67See Calvert, supra note 62, at 71 (asserting that, sometimes, “laws and court orders that appear content based, either on their face or by their operation, are held
content-neutral by the Supreme Court”).
68See Demaske, supra note 50, at 280–82.
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to its extreme, content neutrality would allow suppression of all
speech because then all speech would be treated equally.69
As illustrated by the two cases previously discussed, Thomas and
City of Littleton, the Supreme Court seems increasingly focused on
content neutrality within the doctrine of prior restraint. Content
neutrality, however, may be particularly ill-suited as the primary
measuring stick for the constitutionality of government action that
results in the prior restraint of speech. This is so for two reasons, one
theoretical and one pragmatic. From a theoretical standpoint, allowing content-neutral prior restraint by the government does not
square with what has been understood about the prior restraint doctrine for the last 225 years. From a pragmatic standpoint, the difficulties of defining content neutrality are exacerbated in the prior
restraint context, thus threatening inhibition of even more speech
than perhaps was intended by the Supreme Court when it announced Thomas and City of Littleton.
The doctrine of prior restraint encompasses two concepts. First,
and most obviously, it stands for the idea that government may not
prohibit communication or expression before the fact. At the time
of the ratification of the First Amendment, freedom of speech and
press in England and America meant that a printer could “put
forth to the world what one wanted, as long as the printer was willing to accept the consequences of punishment for material considered illegal.”70 This understanding is underscored by the wellknown assertion of Sir William Blackstone in 1769 that “liberty of
the press … consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published.”71 Likewise, the Supreme Court early in the twentieth
century adopted the rule that the First Amendment prevented “all
such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced

69See Redish, supra note 52, at 128–39. For a defense of the theoretical basis for
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulation, see Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189
(1983).
70Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34
IND. L. REV. 295, 311 (2001). See also Smith, supra note 23, at 450 (“A significant
amount of historical evidence suggests that the first amendment was meant to preclude the possibility of future government-initiated actions aimed at stopping or
punishing mere expression.”).
71Id. at 311 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 151–52 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1979) (1765–69)).
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by other governments.”72 The idea that certain prior restraints—
namely, those that are content neutral—are acceptable from a constitutional standpoint is, thus, difficult if not impossible to square
with what the doctrine of prior restraint has meant for the nation’s
entire history.
The second concept encompassed by the doctrine of prior restraint deals with the constitutional principle of separation of powers. One scholar described the concept this way: “The ‘prior’ in the
prior restraint doctrine refers not only to regulatory activity which
is undertaken before the specific expression is communicated, but
also when the executive or judicial branch acts out of its ‘constitutional order’ vis-à-vis the other branches of government.”73 Under
this view, a prior restraint occurs whenever government suppresses expression before it has taken place, or whenever even a
temporary prohibition of speech occurs without the benefit of a full
and fair judicial hearing.74 This aspect of the prior restraint doctrine is primarily concerned with not allowing executive branch
censors to make a final determination of whether speech may be
constitutionally restrained before it is expressed. This is the concern addressed by the Supreme Court in Freedman when it articulated three procedural safeguards, particularly a requirement for a
prompt judicial resolution.
In Professor Monaghan’s view, at the heart of Freedman was the
concept that the government could not deprive individuals and
groups of their free speech liberty without ensuring due process.75
Much of the due process guarantee came in the form of requiring
that final censorship decisions be made by the branch of government
most qualified to judge when speech interests should give way to legislative or executive regulatory interests:
Central to first amendment due process is the notion that a judicial,
rather than an administrative, determination of the character of the
speech is necessary. Cases in the obscenity area first established the
principle, but neither their reasoning nor their language implies that
the principle is restricted to obscenity determinations. … Nothing in
the rationale of Freedman and its predecessors suggests that their
principles are confined to the obscenity area. In fact, when the subject

72Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313 (1825)).
73Meyerson, supra note 70, at 339.
74See id. at 340; Redish, supra note 24, at 75.
75Monaghan, supra note 4, at 518–19.
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matter of speech is political in character rather than bordering on the
obscene, the need for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater.
One can, then, hypothesize as a general principle of first amendment
due process that no procedure is valid which leaves the protected character of speech to the final determination of an administrative agency,
no matter how “judicial” its procedure.76

Turning from theory to pragmatism, the idea that contentneutral prior restraints are presumptively constitutional may be
unworkable. Distinguishing between content-based and contentneutral regulation is not an easy task with clear results even when
speech already has taken place. When the determination must be
made before the speech has been communicated, however, the task
becomes even more difficult. The problem is that in the prior restraint context, it is unclear what effect a particular regulation has
on speech and, therefore, the only alternative is to look to legislative intent for guidance. But as has been demonstrated, legislative
intent is not always discernible and, even if it were, it would not be
the sine qua non of deciding whether a particular regulation is constitutionally suspect. Thus, regulators, speakers and judges are left
to guess about whether a regulation that has yet to be applied is
content neutral with respect to a hypothetical form of expression.
SAFEGUARDS IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL AFTER 2002
A review of decisions from U.S. circuit courts demonstrates the
extent to which the procedural safeguards of Freedman are disappearing from First Amendment jurisprudence.77 Of the seventeen
federal intermediate appellate court opinions since 2002 citing either Thomas or City of Littleton, four cases arose in the context of
local government licensing schemes for sexually oriented businesses.78 The remaining opinions arose in various other contexts,
including a licensing regime for leafleting and vending in down76Id.

at 520, 524–25.
study identified seventeen cases from federal circuit courts of appeal since
2002 citing the Supreme Court opinion in either Thomas or City of Littleton. Analysis of these intermediate federal appellate opinions forms the basis for the observations herein about the state of the Freedman safeguards in contemporary federal
jurisprudence.
78See Deja Vu of Cincinnati LLC v. Union Twnshp. Bd. of Trustees, 411 F.3d 777
(6th Cir. 2005); Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2004);
Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003); Fly Fish,
Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
77This
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town Las Vegas,79 an ordinance requiring parade permits,80 a Department of Veterans Affairs’ decision on flying the Confederate
flag at a national cemetery in Maryland,81 a protest permit regime
for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City,82 an Oregon
highway billboard law,83 the Oregon Mass Gathering Act,84 a mass
demonstration permit regime in Georgia,85 a leafleting license regime for Boston’s Fish Pier,86 and sign ordinances in the Florida
municipalities of St. Petersburg,87 Clearwater,88 Neptune Beach89
and St. John’s County.90 That fewer than one fourth of the recent
cases arose in the adult business licensing context underscores Professor Monaghan’s point that procedural safeguards and First
Amendment due process are not confined to sexually oriented
speech questions.91
The appellate judges who issued the seventeen opinions struggled somewhat to distinguish between content-neutral and content-based regulation. The Ninth Circuit Court, for example,
concluded that there was no basis to determine whether the Las
Vegas vending permit requirement was content neutral or content
based because the regulation failed to set forth any standards to
guide administrative decision making.92 Ultimately, the court held
that the prohibition on vending without authorization was unconstitutional because it was susceptible to content-based application.93 Meanwhile, an absolute ban on leafletting in the public fo-

79ACLU

v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003).
v. City of Lynchburg, 300 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 2002).
81Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
82Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1250
(10th Cir. 2004).
83Lombardo v. Warner, 353 F.3d 774, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2003).
84S. Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir.
2004); S. Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 401 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
85Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Co., 365 F.3d 1247, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2004).
86New England Regional Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir.
2002).
87Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278,
1279–80 (11th Cir. 2003).
88Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1115
(11th Cir. 2003).
89Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005)
90Cafe Erotica of Florida v. St. John’s County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
2004).
91See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 519–25.
92ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2003).
93Id.
80Reyes
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rum was content neutral but unconstitutional because it was not
narrowly tailored and did not leave open ample communication
channels.94 Among the other sixteen federal circuit court opinions,
five involved content-based regulation95 and eleven involved content-neutral regulation of speech.96
Several of the federal appellate courts have concluded, in the wake
of Thomas, that none of the three procedural safeguards are required
when the licensing or permit scheme is content neutral.97 The Eleventh Circuit, however, suggested in one opinion that at least one of
the procedural safeguards might still be required for content-neutral
regulation that could be applied in a content-based way.98 The Fed-

94Id.

at 1106.
Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005)
(sign ordinance was content based in that it exempted from the definition of a sign
things such as flags and insignias, religious symbols, memorial signs, works of art
and signs carried by a person, among others); Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Co., 365
F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (county ordinance was content based because it required
permits for groups of five or more demonstrators in a public forum and applied only
to groups of protestors and not soccer players, sidewalk performers and tailgaters);
Cafe Erotica of Florida v. St. John’s County, 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (ordinance was content based because it limited the size of “political message” signs but
not commercial signs); Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 337 F.3d 1301
(11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that an ordinance was content based because it banned
nudity in adult entertainment establishments and not elsewhere in the city); Griffin
v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (military cemetery’s flag
display was content based because cemetery flew U.S. and POW/MIA flags but not
Confederate flag).
96See Deja Vu of Cincinnati LLC v. Union Twnshp. Bd. of Trustees, 411 F.3d 777
(6th Cir. 2005) (en banc); S. Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 401 F.3d 1124
(9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2004); S. Oregon Barter Fair v.
Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2004); Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2004); Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San
Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003); Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of
St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2003); Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v.
City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2003); Lombardo v. Warner, 353 F.3d
774 (9th Cir. 2003); New England Regional Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284
F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002); Reyes v. City of Lynchburg, 300 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2002).
97See, e.g., S. Oregon Barter Fair, 372 F.3d 1128, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2004) (regulation governing decision whether to grant permit for event billed as religious gathering, harvest celebration and counterculture craft fair); Utah Animal Rights
Coalition, 371 F.3d 1248, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004) (regulation governing protests in
Salt Lake City during 2002 Winter Olympic Games); Granite State, 348 F.3d 1278,
1281 (11th Cir. 2003) (municipal sign ordinance); Griffin, 288 F.3d 1309, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (regulation governing decision whether to allow placement of Confederate flag in national cemetery); New England Regional Council, 284 F.3d 9, 21 (1st
Cir. 2002) (regulation governing permits for leafletting on sidewalks near Boston’s
Fish Pier).
98See Granite State, 351 F.3d at 1118 (stating that time limits on administrative
decision making “are required when their lack could result in censorship of certain
95See
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eral Circuit concluded that the procedural safeguards were not applicable to content-based government regulation of speech on
government property classified as a nonpublic forum.99 In that case,
the court acknowledged that, under Freedman and Thomas, the procedural safeguards normally apply when prior restraint is content
based.100 The court even expounded on the reasoning behind the procedural safeguards, specifically mentioning the danger of contentbased choices being made in the name of content-neutral regulation:
“If a licensing scheme allows a government official to delay indefinitely before approving or denying a license, then a system masquerading as a time, place or manner regulation may in reality allow
officials to suppress disfavored speech arbitrarily.”101 Yet the court’s
refusal to apply the procedural safeguards made the statement somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Burden of Proof
Although commentators and jurists characterized the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Freedman as speaking broadly and idealistically of
requiring government censors to initiate legal action before deciding
to censor speech,102 and of imposing the burden of proof on the government once in court, the Freedman opinion itself stated only that
“the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must
rest on the censor.”103 For this proposition, the Freedman Court relied on Speiser v. Randall,104 in which the Court considered the constitutionality of a California property-tax exemption for military
viewpoints or ideas, … but are not categorically required when the permitting
scheme is content-neutral”) (emphasis in original) (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. 51,
58–59 (1965) and Thomas, 534 U.S. 316, 322–24 (2002)).
99Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1328.
100Id.
101Id.
102In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, for example, Justice O’Connor wrote: “In
Freedman, we determined that … the censor must bear the burden of going to court
to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof once in court.” 493 U.S.
215, 227 (1990). Meanwhile, Professor Monaghan spoke broadly of the First Amendment due process established in Freedman and other cases. See Monaghan, supra
note 4, at 518–25.
103380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). Later in the opinion, the Freedman Court did state: “It
is readily apparent that the Maryland procedural scheme does not satisfy these criteria. First, once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of persuading the courts that the film is
protected expression … .” Id. at 59–60. The Court’s comment about “instituting judicial proceedings,” however, seems less critical in this passage than the requirement of “persuading the courts that the film is protected expression.”
104357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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veterans that placed upon veterans the statutory burden to show
that they were entitled to the exemption.
The California procedure in Speiser required veterans annually to
apply for the veterans’ property-tax exemption.105 Part of the application form consisted of an oath of loyalty to the federal and state
governments; the entire form, including the loyalty oath, was designed to facilitate the tax assessor’s determination about whether
the claimant was entitled to the exemption.106 “The assessor [had]
the duty of investigating the facts,” the Court noted. “If the assessor
believes that the claimant is not qualified in any respect, he may
deny the exemption and require the claimant, on judicial review, to
prove the incorrectness of the determination.”107
The Court recognized that, generally, no constitutional violation
would arise from a tax exemption scheme requiring the proponent of
an exemption to establish his or her eligibility.108 However, the
Court said that such placement of the burden of proof was inappropriate when the tax liability turned out to be, in reality, punishment
for a crime.109 In that case, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution required the burden of proof to be placed on the government;
similarly, the Court held, due process required placement of the burden of proof on the government when it sought to deny a tax exemption because of disagreement with the proponent’s speech.110
The Court’s suggestions in Freedman and subsequent cases that
government must bear the burden of going to court and the burden
of proof once there may be understood only against Speiser’s discussion of due process. In reality, the burden safeguard was about ensuring that the government not be allowed to deprive speech
proponents of their First Amendment liberties without due process.
Thus, the core purpose of this procedural safeguard was that government must not be allowed to simply sit on a permit application advanced by a speech proponent. If the government were allowed to do
that, the result would be effective deprivation of speech liberty without the opportunity to be heard on the appropriateness of such government prior restraint.

105Id.
106Id.

at 515.
at 517.

107Id.
108Id.

at 524–25.
at 525 (citing Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922)).
110Id. at 526 (“The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade
another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens.”).
109Id.
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In Blount v. Rizzi,111 for example, the Court emphasized that the
Postmaster General’s process for denying access to the mails was
constitutionally deficient largely because postal officials could effectively censor speech by dragging their feet and simply refusing to
make a decision one way or the other, all the while holding the postal
materials in question.112 In that case, the Court held that “the fatal
flaw of the procedure [was] failing to require that the Postmaster
General seek to obtain a prompt judicial determination … .”113 Subsequently, the statutory scheme in Blount was characterized as one
that was struck down in part because “an administrative order restricting use of the mails could become effective without judicial approval … .”114
Unlike the other procedural safeguards, the burden safeguard
was substantially undermined even long before the Supreme
Court’s 2002 opinion in Thomas. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,115
in which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
Dallas’ comprehensive sexually oriented business ordinance, has
long been interpreted to stand for the idea that the burden safeguard was no longer required, at least in the adult business licensing context.116 Many litigants no longer even bother to argue that a
prior restraint scheme is unconstitutional for failing to place the
burden of going to court, and the burden of proof once in court, on
the administrative censor.117 The Ninth Circuit Court demonstrated the utter inapplicability of this procedural safeguard when
it held that a prior restraint licensing scheme was not unconstitutional even though the speech proponent bore not only the burden
to bring a legal challenge and the burden of proof once in court but

111400

U.S. 410 (1971).
at 417–18.
113Id. at 418.
114United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368 (1971).
115493 U.S. 215 (1990).
116See, e.g., Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1001 n.6 (9th Cir.
2004) (relying on “Justice O’Connor’s three-judge plurality opinion in FW/PBS” as
authority for eliminating the burden safeguard in the context of adult business licensing). In FW/PBS, Justice O’Connor—joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy—
wrote that the Dallas ordinance differed from the Maryland law in Freedman because it did not allow content-based choices by government censors and because
there was greater incentive for adult businesses to litigate perceived constitutional
violations. 493 U.S. at 229–30 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). For those reasons, Justice
O’Connor wrote, there was no need to impose the burden of going to court and the
burden of proof on the government. Id. (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
117See, e.g., Reyes v. City of Lynchburg, 300 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Also,
no question is made in this case of any burden of proof required by the City to support the denial of a parade permit, the third Freedman requirement.”).
112Id.
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also the burden of proof in administrative proceedings.118 Some
courts, however, still speak in terms of imposing the burden of
proof on government when considering content-based regulation of
speech subject to heightened scrutiny.119
The loss of protection once afforded by this procedural safeguard
might not in and of itself be overly harmful to First Amendment interests, if the other safeguards also remained in place. To some extent, this safeguard really addressed the same issue as the other
safeguards—ensuring that administrative decision makers not turn
a content-neutral licensing scheme into a content-based one by simply failing to make a decision about certain disfavored speech. That is
the due process issue highlighted by Speiser. Without the burden of
going to court being placed on the government, speech interests
could still be served—and due process ensured—if administrative decision makers simply faced a time limit on their licensing decisions.
But, as will be demonstrated, the idea that there must be a time limit
on administrative decision making also has been undermined by federal court opinions since 2002.
Preserving Status Quo While Making
Prompt Decisions
In Freedman, the Supreme Court required that prior restraint licensing schemes ensure that the administrative censor will make a
decision on whether to allow speech “within a specific brief period”
and that, in the interim, the status quo must be preserved.120 Some
courts recently have interpreted the status quo requirement to mean
that speech should temporarily be allowed until a final decision is
made.121 But in most cases, the status quo portion of this procedural
safeguard is merely ignored in light of an ongoing inter-circuit (and
intra-circuit) debate about the meaning of Freedman’s “specified
brief period” language.
Several circuits, including the Ninth and Tenth, have held that, after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thomas, content-neutral permit
schemes are not required to impose any time limit on the administrative censor’s decision.122 Although these courts cite Thomas as au118Dream

Palace, 384 F.3d at 1002.
Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Co., 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004).
120380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
121See, e.g., Deja vu of Cincinnati LLC v. Union Twnshp. Bd. of Trustees, 411 F.3d
777, 788 (6th Cir. 2005).
122See, e.g., S. Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2004); Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248,
1259 (10th Cir. 2004).
119See
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thority for the proposition, the permit scheme in Thomas imposed a
twenty-eight-day limit on the administrative decision whether to
grant a permit.123 In light of this fact, some federal circuit judges
have argued that all prior restraint licensing schemes, including content-neutral ones, must have a time limit on the administrative decision.124 Seven active judges on the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
Ninth Circuit panel’s holding that a permit scheme need not contain
any deadline for an official’s decision “accord[ed] governmental authorities unbridled discretion, through official foot dragging, effectively to veto the holding of an event protected by the First
Amendment.”125
The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit had considered the constitutionality of the Oregon Mass Gathering Act in light of a First
Amendment challenge by the Southern Oregon Barter Fair, which
applied for a permit in 1996 to hold an event described as a religious
gathering, harvest celebration and counterculture crafts fair.126 The
panel determined that the act was content neutral because it “applies to all mass gatherings irrespective of the purpose for the gathering [,] … does not single out any particular activity or speech for
regulation [, and] … authorizes the Department of Human Services
to promulgate regulations with respect to water supply, fire protection, and similar health and safety issues attendant on overnight
gatherings of large crowds.”127 Thus, the panel concluded, the act
was not required to include the Freedman procedural safeguards.128
But the court went a step further in holding that Thomas had concluded that content-neutral permit schemes did not need to provide a
time limit on the administrative censor’s decision about whether to
grant a permit.129 The panel noted that, in Thomas, there was a
twenty-eight-day deadline for the City of Chicago to make a decision

123534

U.S. 316, 322–23 (2002).
S. Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 401 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Under the Ninth Circuit
Court’s procedures, any active judge on the court may call for a vote on whether a
case heard by a three-judge panel should be heard by an eleven-judge en banc panel.
Such a call must receive support of a majority of the active judges on the court for the
case to be reheard. The Ninth Circuit has twenty-eight active judges. See U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, General Orders, ch. 5.5 (2005), available at http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/54DBE3FB372DCB6C88256CE50065FC
B8/F769F3AD364D1B6D88256864007A1479?OpenDocument.
125Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
126So. Oregon Barter Fair, 372 F.3d at 1130–31.
127Id. at 1137.
128Id. at 1138.
129Id. (citing Thomas, 534 U.S. 316, 322–23 (2002)).
124See
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on permit applications; but, the panel said, the Supreme Court “did
not indicate that the deadline was an essential component of a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. To read the opinion that
way would flatly contradict the decision’s clear holding that time,
place, and manner regulations need not contain the Freedman safeguards.”130 The panel ultimately concluded that even without the
Freedman safeguards and time limit, the act did not confer unbridled
discretion on government officials charged with making decisions
about permits.131
Under the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing en banc procedures, however,
a judge on the full court requested a vote on whether the panel’s decision should be heard en banc. The vote ultimately failed, and the case
was not reheard, but seven active Ninth Circuit judges dissented
from the denial of rehearing en banc, largely based on disagreements
with the panel’s conclusion that Thomas had done away with the requirement of a time limit on a permit decision.132 The dissenters attacked the panel’s holding that a permit scheme need not contain
any deadline for an official’s decision.133
Central to the dissenting judges’ reasoning was a fine-line distinction some courts have not recognized among the outcomes of
Thomas. The dissenting judges stated that Thomas included two
holdings: first, that content-neutral permit schemes need not include the Freedman safeguards; and, second, that all permit
schemes—including content-neutral ones—should “‘contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject
to effective judicial review,’ so as to avoid their application ‘in such a
manner as to stifle free expression.’”134 The panel, the dissenters
said, ignored the fact that lack of a time limit on a permit decision effectively rendered the official decision without standards.135 The dissenters speculated that perhaps the panel became confused because
Thomas included discussion of whether the Freedman safeguards required prompt judicial review or a prompt judicial decision if a party

130Id.
131Id.
132S. Oregon Barter Fair, 401 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). See supra note 124.
133Id. at 1124 (“The panel’s decision is in square conflict with the very Supreme
Court precedent upon which it relies, and will permit administrators to impede parties seeking to engage in First Amendment-protected activity on private property.”).
134Id. at 1125 (quoting Thomas, 524 U.S. at 323) (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
135Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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was unsatisfied with a government official’s permit decision.136 But,
according to the dissenters, the issue of the speediness of judicial review was a separate question from the issue of a time limit on the administrative censor’s initial decision about a permit.137
The Ninth Circuit case highlights the issue of whether the
Freedman procedural safeguards were, after all, merely procedural.
At least with respect to a time limit on the initial administrative
decision, the safeguards seemed as much about substance as procedure. At their core, the safeguards aimed to ensure due process by
requiring certain procedural formalities. This point is illustrated in
several recent federal circuit cases reviewing prior restraint licensing schemes. For example, the New England Regional Council of
Carpenters, a labor organization, challenged restrictions to its efforts to pass out leaflets on Boston’s Fish Pier, owned by the Massachusetts Port Authority.138 In reviewing the permit scheme in
question, the First Circuit noted that the prior restraint doctrine
includes both substantive protections—primarily prohibiting unbridled discretion—and procedural protections, such as those embodied in Freedman’s safeguards.139 The court concluded that the
Fish Pier itself was a nonpublic forum, and, thus, the absolute prohibition on leafleting there need only be reasonable; the court
found reasonableness due to the risk of obstructing vehicular traffic and distracting pedestrians.140
The court concluded that the sidewalks near the Fish Pier constituted a traditional public forum. Because the permit scheme focused
on public safety issues, it was content neutral and, thus, under
Thomas, the Freedman safeguards did not apply.141 The contribution made by the First Circuit was to clarify that what Thomas did
was reduce the focus on procedure and increase the focus on substance when it comes to content-neutral permit schemes. In other
words, those schemes don’t have to meet certain procedures, but
they should have some teeth—some standards to guide the administrative decision maker. Thus, the First Circuit said, Thomas reaffirms the line of cases beginning with Forsyth County v. Nationalist

136Id. at 1127–28 (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). That
question was later decided by City of Littleton in favor of a prompt judicial decision.
See City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J. Gifts D–4, 541 U.S. 774, 781 (2004).
137Id. at 1125–26 (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
138New England Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002).
139Id. at 21.
140Id. at 24–25.
141Id. at 21.
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Movement142 with respect to the substantive requirements for permit schemes.143
But then the First Circuit subverted the value that might come out
of substantive protections. The provision in question did not give
much in the way of standards to guide the permit decision; essentially, permits could be revoked if leafleting posed “a danger to public
safety or would impede the convenient passage of pedestrian or vehicular traffic.”144 But, in light of the fact that it found no evidence of
“unfair or discriminatory” application of the public safety standard,
the court deferred to the state’s view that the permit scheme could be
construed to limit discretion.145 The court concluded: “If and when a
pattern of abuse emerges, that will be the time to deal with infelicitous applications of the regulations.”146 The court also found it important that the permit scheme provided for automatic issuance of
permits, which then had to be revoked if they posed safety hazard.147
Meanwhile, two Eleventh Circuit opinions provide further basis
on which to rest a conclusion that procedural and substantive
protections are part of the same effort to protect speech interests and
ensure due process. In reviewing the constitutionality of the St. Petersburg, Florida, sign ordinance, the court concluded that no time
limits were required on a permit decision maker after Thomas.148
The court held that, even without a time limit, the content-neutral
sign ordinance contained adequate standards to guide officials’ decisions because signs could be rejected only for failure to meet objective
criteria set forth in detail in the ordinance.149 The court stated:
We realize City officials could potentially delay the processing of certain permit applications and thereby arbitrarily suppress disfavored
speech. We will not, however, address hypothetical constitutional violations in the abstract. As the Supreme Court noted in Thomas, we believe “abuse must be dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful
favoritism appears, rather than by insisting upon a degree of rigidity
that is found in few legal arrangements.”150

142505

U.S. 123 (1992).
284 F.3d at 21.
144Id. at 25–26.
145Id. at 26.
146Id.
147Id. at 25.
148Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278
(11th Cir. 2003).
149Id. at 1282.
150Id. (quoting Thomas, 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002)).
143Kinton,
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A different Eleventh Circuit panel put a slightly different spin on its
interpretation of Thomas about a month after the case involving St.
Petersburg, however.151 Interpreting a similar sign ordinance in
Clearwater, Florida, the panel seemed to back off from the statement
that time limits on an administrative decision maker’s permit decision
might never be required; time limits, the court held, “are required
when their lack could result in censorship of certain viewpoints or
ideas, … but are not categorically required when the permitting
scheme is content-neutral.”152 Other courts have cited Thomas for the
proposition that even though content-neutral permit schemes are not
subject to Freedman safeguards, there must nevertheless be sufficient
guidelines for a censor’s decision or else a content-neutral scheme may
be applied in a content-discriminatory way.153
Prompt Judicial Review
As discussed previously, the Freedman requirement that a prior
restraint scheme should “assure a prompt final judicial decision”154
has become largely symbolic rather than effectual in contemporary
licensing cases. In the years immediately following Freedman, lack of
this procedural safeguard was invoked as justification for declaring
prior restraints unconstitutional. As with the burden of proof safeguard, the heart of this safeguard seemed to be its focus on preventing administrative decision makers from dragging out decisions
under a content-neutral scheme in such a way as to effectively restrict certain speech based on its content.
For example, in Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad,155 the Court
held that a municipality’s decision not to allow presentation of the
rock musical Hair in a city-leased theater infringed First Amendment rights because the city’s procedure lacked the necessary safeguards. The Court pointed to lack of a prompt judicial review
requirement, among other factors, and stated that “[e]ffective review on the merits was not obtained until more than five months” after the initial application.156 The result of the application process

151Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th
Cir. 2003).
152Id. at 1118 (emphasis in original) (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965)
and Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322–24).
153See ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Reyes
v. City of Lynchburg, 300 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 2002) (Michael, J., dissenting).
154Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
155420 U.S. 546 (1975).
156Id. at 562.
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was that the speech proponent was forced to delay production.157
Courts in other cases also expressed concern that the primary problem caused by lack of prompt judicial review was the risk of infringing timely due process and failing to provide substantive guidance to
administrative decision making.158
In City of Littleton, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that adult business licensing schemes must ensure prompt judicial decision making
rather than merely prompt access to judicial processes.159 However,
that case also held that the judicial process as it already existed in
Colorado was prompt enough to satisfy the Freedman safeguard.160
Thus, one of the three Freedman safeguards seemingly came to be
meaningless, at least in the adult business licensing context.
Recent intermediate federal court opinions in which the permit
scheme was content-based, necessitating the application of at least
some of the Freedman safeguards,161 have dismissively pointed to City
of Littleton in holding that normal judicial processes are sufficient to
satisfy Freedman’s prompt judicial review requirement.162 For example, the Sixth Circuit recently concluded that an adult business licensing scheme in Ohio satisfied this requirement because the plaintiff
“has given us ‘no reason to doubt the willingness of [Ohio]’s judges to
exercise the[ir] powers wisely so as to avoid serious threats of delayinduced First Amendment harm[.]’”163 Because of the limited applica157Id.
158See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 (1980) (stating
that a Texas law “authorizes prior restraints of indefinite duration on the exhibition
of motion pictures that have not been finally adjudicated to be obscene”).
159541 U.S. 774, 780–81 (2004).
160Id. at 782.
161As the Fifth Circuit noted in Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330
F.3d 288, 296 (5th Cir. 2003), content-neutral regulation of sexually oriented businesses need only satisfy two of the Freedman requirements: maintaining the status
quo and prompt judicial review. The placement of the burden of proof on the censor
is no longer required after FW/PBS.
162See Bronco’s Entm’t Ltd. v. Charter Twnshp. of Van Buren, 421 F.3d 440, 447
(6th Cir. 2005) (“The ordinance does not establish special rules for an accelerated judicial decision, but such rules are unnecessary under Littleton… . Ordinary court
rules are constitutionally sufficient … .”); Odle v. Decatur Co., Tenn., 421 F.3d 386,
391 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Littleton
on what constitutes sufficiently prompt judicial review for purposes of a facial challenge to a licensing scheme, we conclude that the Act’s provisions are more than adequate.”); Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“In effect, the Court in City of Littleton established a presumption that state courts
function quickly enough, and with enough solicitude for the First Amendment
rights of license applicants, to avoid the unconstitutional suppression of speech that
arises from undue delay in judicial review.”).
163Deja Vu of Cincinnati LLC v. Union Twnshp. Bd. of Trustees, 411 F.3d 777,
788 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting City of Littleton, 541 U.S. at 782).
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bility of the Freedman safeguards, it remains to be seen how courts will
deal with the prompt judicial review issue in content-based prior restraint schemes other than the adult business licensing context.
Observations About Content Neutrality
and Prior Restraint
After Thomas, most federal intermediate appellate courts have
continued to hold to the idea that content-based prior restraint licensing schemes must still provide for the Freedman procedural
safeguards in order to pass constitutional muster.164 But one of the
results of Thomas may be to send the signal to lower courts that the
procedural safeguards are no longer important. In at least one postThomas circuit court case, the procedural safeguards were not applied even though the prior restraint in question was clearly content
based. In that case, a challenge was mounted to the Department of
Veterans Affairs’ decision not to fly the Confederate flag at a national cemetery in Maryland.165 The decision was made pursuant to a
federal regulation that prohibited unauthorized demonstrations, including flying of flags, on VA property.166 The decision not to fly the
Confederate flag was clearly content-based regulation, but the court
held that the regulation was reasonable regulation of speech in a
nonpublic forum.167 Although conceding that the federal regulation
in question granted virtually unbridled discretion,168 the court nevertheless concluded that the decision of which flag to fly was akin to
government speech unrestrained by the First Amendment.169
164See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1271 (11th
Cir. 2005) (holding that sign ordinance was content based—it exempted from definition of a sign things such as flags and insignias, religious symbols, memorial signs,
works of art and signs carried by a person—and thus Freedman safeguards were required); Cafe Erotica of Florida v. St. John’s County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir.
2004) (holding that sign ordinance was content-based—it limited the size of “political message” signs but not commercial signs—and applying Freedman safeguards);
Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Co., 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding a
county ordinance to be content based and observing that such an ordinance must
satisfy Freedman’s safeguards); Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990,
998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying two Freedman safeguards to an adult business
regulatory scheme); Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 337 F.3d 1301, 1313
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a licensing ordinance for adult businesses was unconstitutional in that it vested unbridled discretion in official decision makers in part
because the ordinance failed to place a time limit on the officials’ decision whether to
issue a permit).
165Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
166Id. at 1319.
167Id. at 1321–22.
168Id. at 1323.
169Id. at 1324–25.
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Another outcome of Thomas is the erosion of the arguably substantive time limit requirement on an administrative decision maker
charged with deciding whether to allow speech. This poses the risk of
failure to ensure due process, which was the primary concern behind
procedural safeguards going back to Freedman and, before it, to
Speiser. As previously discussed, the circuit courts that have considered the issue have determined that time limits are not required. But
this may lead to the dubious principle that the earlier someone applies for a permit, the longer government can drag its feet. That this
principle is more than mere speculation was demonstrated when the
Utah Animal Rights Coalition applied in March 2001 to stage demonstrations during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, scheduled for approximately one year hence in Salt Lake City.170 The city failed to
respond for eight months and ultimately denied some of the coalition’s requested times and places for demonstrations. The coalition
challenged the ordinance, which required granting of permits unless
the requested demonstrations conflicted with other events already
planned, impeded traffic or conflicted with police and fire personnel
movements.171
The Tenth Circuit Court concluded that the ordinance was content neutral.172 The court also held that Thomas, not Freedman, governed the challenge. The court then stated: “Under the guidance of
Thomas, then, our inquiry narrows to whether the regulations: (1)
possess adequate standards to guide the exercise of official discretion
and make possible meaningful judicial review; and (2) are narrowly
tailored to a significant state interest while leaving open satisfactory
alternative means of communication.”173 Although it was speaking
in the context of a facial challenge to the Salt Lake City ordinance,
the court reasoned that a limit on the decision maker’s discretion
was not necessary under the facts of the case because an eight-month
delay did not hinder the coalition’s plans to engage in speech during
the Olympics, which were scheduled nearly twelve months after the
filing of the initial permit application.174 Given that factual background, the court held that “there is no constitutional requirement
for a fixed deadline in the context of permit applications under a content-neutral regulatory scheme.”175
170Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir.
2004).
171Id. at 1251–52.
172Id. at 1260.
173Id.
174Id. at 1259.
175Id. at 1260.
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Finally, the focus on content neutrality may be misplaced in some
instances within the prior restraint context. This was illustrated
when an Oregon homeowner with a large sign reading “For Peace in
the Gulf” posted in his front yard brought a constitutional challenge
to an Oregon highway billboard law.176 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
concluded that the content-neutral billboard law was constitutional
because it did not place unbridled discretion in the hands of official
decision makers, but a dissenting judge reasoned that content neutrality could not be determined without first examining the substantive standards governing the exercise of discretion: “Without
‘narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority,’ the [law]’s bare promise of content neutrality can never be
tested.”177 Without definite standards, the statute could be applied
in a content-based way and thus it would be impossible to say
whether Freedman’s safeguards should apply or not.
CONCLUSION
In Thomas and City of Littleton, the Supreme Court has partially
discarded the procedural safeguards expounded four decades ago in
Freedman. Essentially, the Court has replaced those procedural safeguards—maintenance of status quo during speedy administrative
decision making, prompt judicial resolution, and placement of burden of proof on government censor—with the belief that content
neutrality is enough to stem the tide of improper prior restraints of
speech. But the procedural safeguards were more than procedural—
they stood for a broader understanding of the principle that the censors whose business it is to censor should not make final decisions
about the propriety of their restraints of speech. The goal of ensuring
due process as a means of protecting First Amendment speech interests may not be served by content neutrality in the absence of procedural safeguards.
It might be argued that loss of procedural safeguards after
Thomas and, particularly, City of Littleton, is not particularly troubling to most speech because the safeguards primarily have been applied in the context of regulating adult businesses. In reality,
however, the death of procedural safeguards in the content-neutral
adult business licensing context is not the only potential speechimpairing result of current jurisprudence. More than three-quarters
176Lombardo

v. Warner, 353 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2003).
at 786 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting) (quoting Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123,
131 (1992)).
177Id.
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of recent federal intermediate appellate opinions reviewed in this
study did not deal with adult business licensing, and many of those
opinions held that procedural safeguards were not necessary for
prior restraint schemes targeting protest speech and other politically
oriented speech. Just as Professor Monaghan concluded three decades ago that erection of a procedural safeguard did not protect
speech only in obscenity cases, so too it is with contemporary erosion
of those same safeguards. Loss of procedural safeguards in favor of
content neutrality poses a risk to speech interests in multiple areas.
In light of Thomas and, to a lesser extent, City of Littleton, federal
appellate courts have begun to further undermine the safeguards that
were in reality both substantive as well as procedural. Without imposition of a time limit on administrative decision making regarding
speech permits, the government may infringe speech without ever being forced to categorically reject a license application. In this sense, at
least, recent intermediate appellate court opinions demonstrate that
prior restraint jurisprudence is moving away from the idea that prior
restraints are presumptively invalid and toward the idea that government may impede speech before it is communicated in all but the increasingly exceptional cases of content-based regulation.

